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Abstract
Background: Unmet medical need (UMN) had been declining steadily across Europe
until the 2008 Recession, a period characterized by rising unemployment. We examined
whether becoming unemployed increased the risk of UMN during the Great Recession
and whether the extent of out-of-pocket payments (OOP) for health care and income re-
placement for the unemployed (IRU) moderated this relationship.
Methods: We used the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to
construct a pseudo-panel (n¼ 135 529) across 25 countries to estimate the relationship
between unemployment and UMN. We estimated linear probability models, using a
baseline of employed people with no UMN, to test whether this relationship is mediated
by financial hardship and moderated by levels of OOP and IRU.
Results: Job loss increased the risk of UMN [b¼ 0.027, 95% confidence interval (CI)
0.022–0.033] and financial hardship exacerbated this effect. Fewer people experiencing
job loss lost access to health care in countries where OOPs were low or in countries
where IRU is high. The results are robust to different model specifications.
Conclusions: Unemployment does not necessarily compromise access to health care.
Rather, access is jeopardized by diminishing financial resources that accompany job
loss. Lower OOPs or higher IRU protect against loss of access, but they cannot guarantee
it. Policy solutions should secure financial protection for the unemployed so that re-
sources do not have to be diverted from health.
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Introduction
The declining trend in unmet medical need (UMN) in Europe
suffered a reversal at the onset of the Great Recession in
2008 as more people began reporting that they were forego-
ing care because it was too expensive.1,2 In response to the
crisis some governments increased co-payments for some ser-
vices and treatments, but these changes were implemented
some time after the crisis, suggesting that this initial rise may
be explained by declining incomes.
Incomes fall due to unemployment and, in many
European economies, the unemployed may have limited
access to healthcare. Reductions in incomes occur even in
countries where unemployment insurance and severance
packages are generous.3,4 When incomes fall, families are
sometimes faced with tough decisions; for example if health
is poor, some households may prioritize spending on hous-
ing or food before health expenditure.5–7 Savings and sever-
ance packages may temporarily enable households to
smooth consumption, even though earnings have fallen.
Financial strain, then, may mediate the relationship be-
tween becoming unemployed and the inability to access
health care.8 In other words, the loss of income due to un-
employment will erode whatever financial buffer a house-
hold may have had and subsequently affect health care
consumption.
National health and social protection policies may
break this association by decreasing or removing financial
barriers to access to medical care and providing income re-
placement for the unemployed (IRU). Many countries,
however, require co-payments when accessing health care,
and higher co-payments have been shown to impair health
care-seeking behaviour.9,10 In these contexts, citizens often
pay more for their health care ‘out-of-pocket’ and so the
impact of job loss UMN may be concentrated in countries
where out-of-pocket payments (OOP) for health care are
higher or where IRU is lower.
Rising UMN may save governments money in the short
term because fewer people may be utilizing state-financed
or -subsidized health care. There are, however, medium-
and long-term health concerns. Delays in seeking diagnosis
and treatment may lead to worse health outcomes,11 and
they may result in preventable hospitalizations in the me-
dium term, which may actually increase net costs.12
Preliminary research indicates that loss of access to the
health system is concentrated among those on low in-
comes, the elderly and the unemployed.1,15 Naturally, ad-
dressing changes in UMN will require accounting for any
health selection into unemployment. There is a longstand-
ing literature exploring whether people with poor health
are more likely to lose their job than people with good
health.13–16 Moreover, the healthy worker effect may
change during recessions, suggesting that people in poor
health may be more likely to lose work.17 Accordingly, we
test the hypothesis of both a confounding and a mediating
effect of health status in the association between becoming
unemployed and the probability of reporting UMN.
In this paper, using a uniquely constructed dataset, we
test whether: (i) becoming unemployed increases the prob-
ability of reporting UMN; (ii) the association is mediated
by the reduced availability of individual resources; and (iii)
the association between becoming unemployed and the
probability of reporting UMN is moderated by OOP
spending on health care as well as by the level of IRU.
Methods
We collected EU-SILC data between 2008 and 2010 be-
cause: (i) the recession began in 2008, leading to wide-
spread unemployment in Europe (EUROSTAT 2015); and
(ii) preliminary empirical analysis of the UMN trend indi-
cates sudden and substantial reversal of the decline in
UMN in 2008.1 We follow these individuals until 2010,
because in 2011 EU governments started enacting austerity
measures that affected unemployment, incomes, OOP and
access to health care, thereby potentially changing the rela-
tionship between job loss and UMN.16–18
Building the dataset
The EU SILC releases a cross-sectional and a longitudinal
version. Some of the data captured in the former are not in
Key Messages
• Job loss decreased access to medical care during the Great Recession in the European Union.
• Financial hardship is one of the mechanisms through which unemployment affects access to medical care.
Unemployment, thus, does not necessarily compromise access to health care. Rather, access is jeopardized by dimin-
ishing financial resources that accompany job loss.
• Fewer people experiencing job loss lost access to medical care in countries where out-of-pocket payments wse low
and where income replacement is high.
• Policy solutions should secure financial protection for the unemployed so that resources do not have to be diverted
away from health.
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the latter and vice versa. This was the case with variable of
interest: UMN. This limits our ability to explore how
changing circumstances for any particular individual may
be associated with changes in UMN. Therefore, in order to
optimize the research design possibilities offered by the em-
ployment status data collected yearly from the same indi-
vidual in the longitudinal arm and the access to health care
data in the cross-sectional arm, we produced a pseudo-
panel for UMN. We used a matching procedure to identify
observations that had the same characteristics in the two
arms of the survey according to a set of predetermined
variables. Observations that were not matched were
removed from the analytical data. Matching percentages
reached figures of 95% of individuals in the longitudinal
arm in the best years and 88% in the least good. The com-
position of the matched sample is representative of the sur-
vey population, suggesting that non-matched observations
were effectively missing-at-random.
To assess the impact of a transition to unemployment,
we restricted the sample to those interviewed in 2009 and
2010 and who in the previous year were employed and did
not report UMN, allowing us to capture exclusively the
hypothesized direction of change from employment into
unemployment, making the most of the panel structure of
the data. The restrictions resulted in a sample size of 135
529 observations. Country sample sizes varied between
1480 in Finland to 14 751 in Italy.
The outcome variable
UMN was measured using the question: ‘Was there any
time during the past 12 months when you really needed to
consult with a doctor, undertake medical examination or
medical treatment but did not?’ ‘Yes, at least one occasion’
was coded ‘1’ and ‘No, no occasion’ was coded ‘0’). Need
for dental care was ascertained in a separate question.19
Predictor and control variables
The predictor variable, ‘employment status’ has four re-
sponse categories: ‘Employed’, ‘Unemployed’, ‘Retired’
and ‘Inactive’. SILC collects this variable as a self-declared
current ‘main activity status’, determined on the basis of
the most time spent on the activity in question, but no cri-
teria have been specified. ‘If a person has lost a job, then
the situation as of the time of the interview should be re-
ported. In this sense, ‘current’ overrides any concept of
averaging over any specific reference period’.19 We re-
stricted the analysis to the first two categories, to capture
transitions for people active in the labour market.
Standard sociodemographic controls were included in the
analyses: age, a quadratic term for age, sex, education,
marital status, country and year of survey. Income quintile is
a categorical variable constructed from the variable ‘Total
disposable household income’. The 1st quintile represents
the top 20% earners and the 5th, the lowest. ‘Difficulty to
Make Ends Meet’ is a binary variable created from grouping
the five categories of the original variable: ‘With great diffi-
culty’, ‘With difficulty’ and ‘With some difficulty’ were
grouped into ‘Difficult to Make Ends Meet’ and ‘Fairly eas-
ily’ and ‘Easily’. ‘Self-Rated Health’ that was ‘Very Good’
and ‘Good’ was grouped into ‘Good Health’ (the reference
category); ‘Fair Health’ remained coded as such, and ‘Very
Bad’ and ‘Bad’ were grouped into ‘Bad Health’.
The variable OOP made by households as a percentage
of total health expenditure was collected for each country
and year from the WHO Health for All database. The vari-
able IRU was created from expenditure data on yearly
country unemployment benefits in euros, divided by the
number of unemployed, both obtained from Eurostat. This
proxy measure gives an overview of government commit-
ment to spending on unemployment support, but cannot
measure the generosity of support at the individual level.
Statistical models
We used random (RE), fixed effects (FE) and linear prob-
ability models (LPM)20 as well as country random coeffi-
cients multilevel models. RE models are represented by
Equations 1 and 2.
Eq.1 RE model, mediator role of financial strain:
UMNit ¼ l0 þ b1Employmentit þ b2Ageit þ b3Age2it þ b4
L: SelfRated Health þ Zi þ b5Income Quintileit
þ b6Ends Meetit þ b7Employmentit
 Ends Meetit þ ai þ eit
Where i¼ 1,. . ., n individuals each of whom is measured at
three points t¼ 1,. . ., 3 in time. m0 is an intercept. The set of
predictor variables that vary over time is represented by the
name of the variable and the subscript it. Those that do not
vary over time–e.g. Sex, Country of Residence–are repre-
sented by the vector Zi. The two error terms are represented
by ai–the combined effect on the dependent variable of all
unobserved variables that are constant over timeand eit–the
purely random variation at each point in time.
To test whether poor health confounds the association,
we introduced a lagged variable capturing individual health
in the year preceding unemployment. Restrictions to the
sample dictate that only individuals who in the preceding
year were employed and had their health needs met were
analysed. If they had poor health in the previous year and
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were also employed, it is unlikely that the cause for dismissal
was poor health. To test poor health’s mediating effect,
ideally we would have used a lead variable for self-rated
health to account for the possibility that ill health followed
unemployment. However, the restrictions imposed on the
sample yielded too few observations. Instead, we tested the
hypothesis using self-rated health in the year of job loss.
Additionally, we restricted the sample to those whose
health status had not changed, and used both RE and FE
LPMs. The former addresses the possibility that those who
are chronically ill lose their jobs more easily and also have
more UMN than those who are not, by, within the
unchanged health group, controlling for health status. We
tested the mediating effect of financial hardship by control-
ling for Income and Difficulty to Make Ends Meet, and by
adding an interaction term between the two. As a robust-
ness check we used an FE LPM as well as random coeffi-
cient between and within effects linear probability.
Moreover, we applied the initial LPM to a restricted sam-
ple of those gaining employment
Eq.2 RE model, moderator role of OOP and IRU:.
UMNit ¼ l0 þ b1Employmentit þ b2Ageit þ b3Age2it
þ zi þ b4SelfRated Health þ b5Income Quintileit
þ b6Ends Meetit þ b7IRU= b7OOP ai þ eit
where zi is a vector of time invariant variables. IRU is a
binary control variable denoting the country-level measure
above or below the median level of IRU, and OOP a binary
control variable of the country-level measure above or
below the median level of OOP.
Last, we tested whether two country-level variables
(1.OOP and 2.IRU) may moderate the association between
job loss and reporting UMN. We split both variables by their
median values and then re-estimate the association between
job loss and reporting UMN within each set of countries
(Eq.2). First we look at OOP, comparing countries with
low spending ( 19.78%) with countries with high spending
(> 19.78%). Next we examine whether the association
between job loss and reporting UMN varies according to the
income replacement rate for unemployed persons, comparing
countries with a low level of IRU ( 7081.794 euroes per
year and countries with IRU (> 7081.794 euroes per year).
Additionally, we calculated predicted probabilities of UMN
at different employment statuses by type of OOP country.
Results
The percentage of those transitioning from employment
into unemployment in the study period is 4.02%; 4.69%
transitioned from having all of their health needs met into
UMN (Table 1).
Unemployment, unmet medical need and the
confounding role of health status
The coefficient for the simple bivariate association between
unemployment and UMN is b¼0.027 [95% confidence
interval (CI) 0.022–0.033: P< 0.001), or, if 1000 people
lost their jobs, then approximately 27 would also lose
access to health care. In Spain, for example, where the
number of unemployed went from 5.013 million in 2011
to 5.811 million in 2012 (EUROSTAT 2015), our model
predicts that roughly 21 546 people may have experienced
UMN due rising unemployment.
After controlling for demographic factors, those who
become unemployed are 1.4% more likely to experience
UMN than those who remain employed (95% CI 0.008–
0.019: P< 0.001). Health status does not confound or
mediate the association, as the probability remains fairly
stable after the introduction of lagged and current health
status at 1.2% (95% CI 0.007–0.018: P< 0.001) and
1.1% (95% CI 0.006–0.017: P< 0.001), respectively
(Table 2).
Next, we restrict our sample to those whose health has
not changed during the study period, and still find that
those who lost their jobs are 0.087% (95% CI 0.003–
0.015: P< 0.001) more likely to report UMN than those
who remained employed. Those in bad health, however,
are more likely to report UMN (Table 1A, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online) than those in good
health. The FE model applied to this restricted sample con-
firms these findings: job loss increased the probability of
UMN by 1.5% (95% CI 0.006–0.025: P< 0.001) among
those in poor health (Table 2A, available as Supplementary
data at IJE online).
To address the possibility that reporting UMN was a
result of a malaise associated with unemployment rather
than a real clinical need, we used an FE regression of self-
rated health on UMN on a baseline of individuals who
were in good or fair health and had no UMN. Individuals
falling into UMN show an increase in the probability
of reporting worse health (Table 3A, available as
Supplementary data at IJE online).
The mediating role of financial hardship
Controlling for income and financial hardship attenuates
the main coefficient from b¼0.012 (95% CI 0.007–0.018:
P< 0.001) to 0.0089 (95% CI 0.003–0.015: P¼ 0.002), in
support of the mediating effect hypothesis. Further support
comes from the interaction between unemployment and
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the ability to make ends meet. The unemployed who lose
the ability to make ends meet show a 2.5% increase in
probability of reporting UMN vs those who maintain it.
Unemployment per se does not directly cause decreased
access to the health system (Table 3). Rather, the loss of
financial buffering that comes with unemployment seems
to drive the loss of access.
Again, we re-estimate our models adjusting for person-
specific differences that are constant over time, finding that
those who lose their jobs and cannot make ends meet are
2.9% more likely to report UMN than those who can (Table
4A, available as Supplementary data at IJE online). As a val-
idity check, we estimated the effect of gaining employment,
controlling for demographic and economic factors, which
shows a protective effect b¼0.026 (95% CI -0.086–0.033)
(Table 5A, available as Supplementary data at IJE online).
The initial RE model assumed that the error term was
not correlated with the predictors, which in turn, allowed
time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory varia-
bles. We addressed this assumption by estimating a
country-level random coefficients model with between and
within effects (Table 6A, available as Supplementary data
at IJE online). The coefficient for the effect of unemploy-
ment on UMN varies according to unobserved country-
level characteristics, potentially related to the welfare state.
The within country coefficient (b¼ 0.010, 95% CI 0.001–
l0.019: P¼0.025) is positive, similar to that obtained
using random effects (b¼ 0.0089). The between country
effect is larger in countries where the unemployment rate
rises one unit above the average proportion of unem-
ployed: the probability of UMN increases by 31%
(b¼ 0.31, 95% CI 0.030–0.59: P¼ 0.030).
The moderating role of out-of-pocket payments
and income replacement
The effect of becoming unemployed on the probability of
reporting UMN is smaller in low-OOP countries, with a
1.6% increase (b¼0.016 (95% CI 0.0080–0.023: P¼< 0.0
01), than in high-OOP countries, with a 2.5% increase
(b¼ 0.025 (95% CI 0.017–0.033: P< 0.001), controlling for
hardship and IRU (Table 4). However, there is no clear
Table 1. Sample characteristics
2008 2009 2010
Unmet health need No unmet need 125316 (92.52%) 125818 (93%) 126002 (93.07%)
Unmet need 10133 (7.48%) 9469 (7%) 9384 (6.93%)
Economic activity Employed 85938 (55.75%%) 83223 (53.98%) 81918 (53.15%)
Unemployed 6540 (4.24%) 8558 (5.55%) 9366 (6.1%)
Retired 34092 (22.11%) 36188 (23.47%) 37927 (16.99%)
Other inactive 27589 (17.9%) 26201 (16.99%) 24903 (16.15%)
Gender Male 73629 (47.7%) 73629 (47.7%) 73629 (47.7%)
Female 80751 (52.3%) 80751 (52.3%) 80751 (52.3%)
Age Mean age 47.52 48.52 49.52
Marital status Married 92541 (60.29%) 92595 (60.36%) 92735 (60.44%)
Never married 40497 (26.38%) 39678 (25.86%) 38899 (25.35%)
No longer married 20457 (13.33%) 21136 (13.78%) 21808 (14.21%)
Income quintiles 1st quintile 33592 28149 30851
2nd quintile 31165 31445 29979
3rd quintile 29849 32022 30722
4th quintile 30161 31299 31128
5th quintile 29539 31391 31660
Education level Primary only 19629 (13%) 19396 (12.80%) 19274 (12.72%)
Secondary only 101056 (66.89%) 100714 (66.50%) 99724 (65.82%)
Post-secondary 30391 (20.01%) 31358 (20.7%) 32523 (21.46%)
Ability to make
ends meet
Difficult to make ends meet 91367 (59.3%) 92636 (60.1%) 93571 (60.7%)
Not difficult to make ends meet 62709 (40.7%) 61513 (39.9%) 60556 (39.3%)
Self-rated health Good health 87258 (64.77%) 85939 (64.09%) 85215 (63.61%)
Fair health 33215 (24.66%) 33628 (25.08%) 33785 (25.22%)
Poor health 14244 (10.57%) 14534 (10.84%) 14969 (11.17%)
OOP as % of total
health expenditure
19.15% 18.90% 19.00%
Sample countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, UK
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difference in relationship between job loss and UMN in low-
IRU countries (b¼ 0.022, 95% CI 0.014–0.030: P< 0.001)
and high-IRU countries (b¼0.019, 95% CI 0.010–0.027:
P<0.001), controlling for hardship and OOP (Table 5).
Additionally, we calculated predicted probabilities of report-
ing UMN in the two types of OOP countries (Figure 1).
As a robustness check, we used an FE model on the split
samples and obtained similar results (Tables 7A and 8A,
available as Supplementary data at IJE online). What is
more, the effects on UMN of the individual falling from
good health into fair and ill health are over three times larger
in high-OOP countries that in their low-OOP counterparts,
which suggests that as the individual’s health deteriorates
and need is accumulated, the capacity to meet that need is
reduced in high-OOP countries. Individuals who become
unemployed in low-IRU countries show a 1.1% increased
probability of UMN (b¼ 0.011, [95% CI -0.00089–0.023:
P> 0.05), whereas those in high-IRU countries show a 2.2%
probability (b¼0.022, 95% CI 0.0093–0.035: P< 0.001). It
is worth noting, however, that low-IRU individuals in bad
health, and who face financial hardship, are six and four
times more likely to report UNM, respectively, than their
counterparts in high-IRU countries.
Discussion
We find an association between becoming unemployed
and increased UMN. This association is not explained by
Table 2. Linear probability of UMN on employment status, controlling for sociodemographic and health status
Population facing unmet medical need
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment status (baseline¼ employed)
Unemployed 0.027** 0.014** 0.012** 0.011**
[0.022–0.033] [0.0080–0.019] [0.0067–0.018] [0.0055–0.017]
Sex (baseline¼male)
Female 0.0013 0.00057 0.00034
[0.0019–0.0045] [0.0026–0.0038] [0.0035–0.0028]
Age 0.0031** 0.0031** 0.0029**
[0.0021–0.0041] [0.0020–0.0041] [0.0019–0.0039]
Age sq 0.000030** 0.000031** 0.000033**
[0.000041–0.000018] [0.000043–0.000020] [0.000044–0.000022]
Education (baseline¼primary education)
Secondary and other non-tertiary 0.014** 0.013** 0.0094**
[0.021–0.0076] [0.019–0.0057] [0.016–0.0026]
Tertiary 0.025** 0.021** 0.016**
[0.032–0.018] [0.029–0.014] [0.023–0.0091]
Marital status (baseline¼married)
Never married 0.00068 0.00098 0.0020
[0.0048–0.0034] [0.0051–0.0031] [0.0061–0.0021]
No longer married 0.015** 0.014** 0.013**
[0.010–0.020] [0.0090–0.019] [0.0081–0.018]
Lagged self rated health (baseline¼ good)
1l: fair health 0.021**
[0.018–0.025]
2l: bad health 0.036**
[0.029–0.044]
Self-rated health (baseline¼ good)
Fair health 0.045**
[0.042–0.049]
Bad health 0.078**
[0.070–0.085]
Country and year dummies — — — —
Constant 0.055** 0.028* 0.027* 0
[0.053–0.057] [0.052–0.0026] [0.052–0.0020] [0–0]
Observations 127665 127242 125902 125632
95% confidence intervals in brackets. Sample restricted to those who in the previous year were employed and had their health needs met.
*P< 0.05, **P< 0.01.
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Table 3. Linear probability of UMN on employment status: mediating and moderating effect of financial hardship
Population facing unmet medical need
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployed 0.012** 0.010** 0.0089** 0.011
[0.0067–0.018] [0.0047–0.016] [0.0032–0.015] [0.024–0.0021]
Sex (baseline¼male)
Female 0.00057 0.00057 0.00042 0.00045
[0.0026–0.0038] [0.0026–0.0038] [0.0028–0.0036] [0.0027–0.0036]
Age 0.0031** 0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0027**
[0.0020–0.0041] [0.0018–0.0038] [0.0017–0.0038] [0.0017–0.0038]
Age sq 0.000031** 0.000029** 0.000028** 0.000028**
[0.000043–0.000020] [0.000040–0.000018] [0.000039–0.000016] [0.000039–0.000016]
Education (baseline¼primary
education)
Secondary and other non-
tertiary education
0.013** 0.0097** 0.0085* 0.0085*
[0.019–0.0057] [0.017–0.0029] [0.015–0.0017] [0.015–0.0016]
tertiary education 0.021** 0.016** 0.012** 0.012**
[0.029–0.014] [0.023–0.0082] [0.020–0.0052] [0.020–0.0051]
Marital status (baseline
¼married)
Never married 0.00098 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032
[0.0051–0.0031] [0.0074–0.00089] [0.0074–0.00089] [0.0074–0.00089]
No longer married 0.014** 0.0097** 0.0092** 0.0091**
[0.0090–0.019] [0.0046–0.015] [0.0040–0.014] [0.0040–0.014]
Self-rated health (baseline¼
good health)
1l: fair health 0.021** 0.021** 0.020** 0.020**
[0.018–0.025] [0.017–0.024] [0.017–0.023] [0.017–0.023]
2l: bad health 0.036** 0.035** 0.034** 0.034**
[0.029–0.044] [0.027–0.042] [0.026–0.041] [0.026–0.041]
Income (baseline¼5th income
quintile)
4th quintile 0.0073** 0.0058** 0.0058**
[0.0035–0.011] [0.0020–0.0096] [0.0021–0.0096]
3rd quintile 0.014** 0.012** 0.012**
[0.0096–0.019] [0.0072–0.016] [0.0073–0.016]
2nd quintile 0.019** 0.016** 0.016**
[0.014–0.025] [0.011–0.022] [0.011–0.022]
1st quintile 0.034** 0.029** 0.029**
[0.027–0.040] [0.023–0.036] [0.023–0.036]
Not difficult make ends meet 0 0
[0–0] [0–0]
Difficult make ends meet 0.013** 0.012**
[0.010–0.016] [0.0096–0.015]
Baseline unemployed: not difficult
to make ends meet
Unemployed: difficult to make
ends meet
0.024**
[0.010–0.039]
Country and year dummies — — — —
Constant 0.027* 0.030* 0.034** 0.034**
[0.052–0.0020] [0.055–0.0048] [0.059–0.0093] [0.059–0.0088]
Observations 125902 125869 125797 125797
95% confidence intervals in brackets. Sample restricted to those who in the previous year were employed and had their health needs met.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.001.
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health selection; in fact, it is positive even for those individ-
uals whose health remained stable before and after job
loss. Whereas we exclude the possibility that a change in
health status motivates job loss, there is still room for the
possibility that those who are chronically ill lose their jobs
more easily and also have more UMN than those who are
not. We find, however, that even when we control for
health status, our results remain constant.
When household OOPs are higher, the association
between job loss and UMN is stronger, suggesting that
more people becoming unemployed lose access to health
care in these contexts. Likewise, when IRU is lower, the
association between job loss and UMN is stronger than
when IRUs are more generous.
This relationship will create and exacerbate health
inequalities as it penalizes the unemployed, those facing
Table 4. Linear probability regression of unmet health need on employment status in low- and high-OOP countries
Low-OOP countries High-OOP countries
Employment status (baseline¼ employed)
Unemployed 0.016** 0.025**
[0.0080–0.023] [0.017–0.033]
Sex (baseline¼male)
Female 0.0038 0.0040
[0.0078–0.00025] [0.00073–0.0088]
Age 0.0017* 0.0030**
[0.00038–0.0030] [0.0015–0.0045]
Age sq 0.000016* 0.000027**
[0.000030–0.0000014] [0.000043–0.0000100]
Education (baseline¼primary education)
Secondary and other non-tertiary education 0.0097* 0.0015
[0.019–0.00076] [0.011–0.0075]
Tertiary education 0.010* 0.0067
[0.019–0.00065] [0.017–0.0033]
Marital status (baseline¼married)
Never married 0.00018 0.0055
[0.0052–0.0048] [0.012–0.00098]
No longer married 0.0011 0.013**
[0.0051–0.0073] [0.0054–0.021]
Self-rated health (baseline¼ good)
Fair health 0.016** 0.022**
[0.011–0.020] [0.018–0.027]
Good health 0.017** 0.043**
[0.0069–0.027] [0.032–0.054]
Income (baseline¼5th income quintile)
4th income quintile 0.0099** 0.0090*
[0.0059–0.014] [0.0015–0.016]
3rd income quintile 0.019** 0.018**
[0.014–0.025] [0.0097–0.026]
2nd income quintile 0.026** 0.026**
[0.019–0.033] [0.017–0.035]
1st income quintile 0.042** 0.037**
[0.034–0.050] [0.027–0.046]
Financial hardship (baseline¼not difficult to make ends meet)
Difficult to make ends meet 0.012** 0.017**
[0.0090–0.016] [0.013–0.022]
IRU (baseline¼ low income replacement) 0.043** 0.0050
[0.037–0.048] [0.012–0.0016]
Constant 0.036* 0.053**
[0.066–0.0062] [0.088–0.019]
Observations 63987 61810
95% confidence intervals in brackets. Sample restricted to those who in the previous year were employed and had their health needs met. Sample split into low-
and high-copayment countries.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01.
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financial strain and those in poorer health. Our results sug-
gest that unemployment is more strongly correlated with
UMN in countries with higher OOP. However, we see a
slightly different relationship with IRU. Although overall
UMN is lower in countries with more generous financial
protection for the unemployed, this does not benefit the
unemployed more than those in work. Exemptions from
co-payments for those claiming unemployment insurance
may protect those households, but there may be a sizeable
share of the population who are unemployed and not
claiming unemployment insurance, who experience higher
risk of UMN. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, it is trou-
bling that co-payments appear to exacerbate the impact of
job loss by restricting access to care. Such inequities under-
mine the stated goals of health systems developed by the
WHO and the European Commission.21,22
Table 5. Linear probability regression of UMN on employment status in low- and high-IRU countrie
(Low-IRU countries) (High-IRU countries)
Employment status (baseline¼ employed)
Unemployed 0.022** 0.019**
[0.014–0.030] [0.010–0.027]
Sex (baseline¼male)
Female 0.0030 0.0028
[0.0017–0.0078] [0.0074–0.0018]
Age 0.0026** 0.0023**
[0.0012–0.0041] [0.00080–0.0038]
Age sq 0.000022** 0.000023**
[0.000038–0.0000055] [0.000040–0.0000066]
Education (baseline¼primary education)
Secondary and other non-tertiary education 0.000087 0.013**
[0.0099–0.0097] [0.022–0.0044]
Tertiary education 0.0020 0.014**
[0.013–0.0086] [0.023–0.0042]
Marital status (baseline¼married)
Never married 0.0035 0.0040
[0.010–0.0030] [0.0096–0.0015]
No longer married 0.011** 0.00066
[0.0037–0.018] [0.0081–0.0068]
Self-rated health (baseline¼ good)
Fair health 0.024** 0.011**
[0.020–0.029] [0.0070–0.016]
Bad health 0.036** 0.023**
[0.025–0.046] [0.012–0.034]
Income (baseline¼5th income quintile
4th income quintile 0.0039 0.011**
[0.0058–0.014] [0.0069–0.015]
3rd income quintile 0.015** 0.023**
[0.0054–0.025] [0.018–0.028]
2nd income quintile 0.028** 0.031**
[0.018–0.038] [0.022–0.039]
1st income quintile 0.046** 0.047**
[0.036–0.056] [0.034–0.060]
Financial hardship (baseline¼Not difficult to make ends meet)
Difficult to make ends meet 0.014** 0.015**
[0.0093–0.018] [0.011–0.019]
OOP (baseline¼LowOOP countries) 0.0083** 0.0062**
[0.0042–0.013] [0.011–0.0017]
Constant 0.061** 0.0023
[0.096–0.026] [0.036–0.031]
Observations 63412 62385
95% confidence intervals in brackets. Sample restricted to those who in the previous year were employed and had their health needs met. Sample split into low-
and high-income replacement countries.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01.
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There are several important limitations. Our study does
not capture employment security. Those employed on a
precarious contract may also lose access to health care
because they may have fewer financial resources and may
face additional time constraints. More work is needed to
explore whether precarious work is associated with access
to health care. Last, our national-level measure of OOP
overlooks exemptions from co-payments for some house-
holds on the grounds of, for example, low incomes.
Moreover, it does not disentangle the effects of differential
co-payment levels for primary care and emergency services.
Future analyses should unpack this issue in more detail.
Our work has important policy implications. Job loss
harms health. What is more, health consequences of job loss
may be higher in countries where becoming unemployed also
leads to UMN. Reducing OOP or increasing levels of IRU
may protect those who lose work from some of the negative
health consequences of job loss. Yet, across Europe, many
countries have increased OOP, even in primary care, so as to
reduce government spending. These policies may have short-
term benefits for public spending deficits but, when another
recession hits, they may restrict access to health care, particu-
larly among economically vulnerable groups.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at IJE online.
Conflict of interest: None declared.
References
1. Reeves A, McKeee M, Stuckler D. The attack on Universal
Health Coverage in Europe: unmet needs, recession, and auster-
ity. Eur J Public Health 2015;25:364–65.
2. Rodrigues R, Zo´lyomi E, Kalavrezou N, Matsaganis M. The
Impact of the Financial Crisis on Unmet Needs for Health care.
Brussels: European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and
Research, 2013.
3. Jacobson BLS, Lalonde RJ, Sullivan DG. Earnings losses of dis-
placed workers. Am Econ Rev 1993;83:685–709.
4. Gruber BJ. The consumption smoothing benefits of unemploy-
ment insurance. Am Econ Rev 1997;87:192–205.
5. Loopstra R, Reeves A, Taylor-Robinson D, Barr B, McKee M,
Stuckler D. Austerity, sanctions, and the rise of food banks in the
UK. BMJ. 2015;350:1775.
6. da Costa FA, Pedro AR, Teixeira I, Braganc¸a F, da Silva Aranda,
Jose´ Cabrita J. Primary non-adherence in Portugal: findings and
implications. Int J Clin Pharm 2015;37:626–35.
7. Dave DM, Kelly IR. How does the business cycle affect eating
habits? Soc Sci Med 2012;74:254–62.
8. Bloemen HG, Stancanelli EGF. Financial wealth, consumption
smoothing and income shocks arising from job loss. Economica
2005;72:431–52.
9. Gemmill MC, Thomson S, Mossialos E. What impact do
prescription drug charges have on efficiency and equity?
Evidence from high-income countries. Int J Equity Health 2008;
7:12.
10. Trivedi AN, Moloo H, Mor V. Increased ambulatory care copay-
ments and hospitalizations among the elderly. N Engl J Med
2010;362:320–28.
11. Ayanian J, Kohler B, Toshi A, Epstein A. The relation between
health insurance coverage and clinical outcomes among women
with breast cancer. NEngl J Med 1993;329:326–31.
12. Weissman JS, Gatsonis C, Epstein AM. Rates of avoidable hospi-
talization by insurance status in Massachusetts and Maryland.
JAMA 1992;268:2388–94.
13. Newhouse J. Free for All? Lessons From the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993.
14. Liebman J, Zeckhauser R. Simple Humans, Complex Insurance,
Subtle Subsidies. Cambridge, MA: NBER, 2008.
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of UMN according to OOP type.
Notes: Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals.
International Journal of Epidemiology, 2018, Vol. 47, No. 1 67
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ije/article-abstract/47/1/58/4161435
by London School of Economics user
on 02 May 2018
15. Reeves A, McKee M, Mackenbach J, Whitehead M, Stuckler D.
Public pensions and unmet medical need among older people:
cross-national analysis of 16 European countries, 2004–2010.
J Epidemiol Community Health 2017;71:174–80.
16. Heise A, Lierse H. The effects of European austerity programmes
on social security systems. Mod Econ 2011;2:498–513.
17. Ortiz I, Cummins M, Capaldo J, Karunanethy K. The decade of
adjustment: a review of austerity trends 2010–2020 in 187 coun-
tries. Geneva: International Labour Office, 2015.
18. K Van Gool, Health Pearson M, Austerity and Economic Crisis:
Assessing the Short Term Impact in OECD Countries. Paris;
OECD, 2014.
19. European Commission. EUROSTAT. Description of Target
Variables: Cross-sectional and Longitudinal 2008 Operation.
(Version January 2010). Brussels: European Commission, 2011.
20. Mood C. Logistic regression: why we cannot do what we think
we can do, and what we can do about it. Eur Sociol Rev 2010;
26:67–82.
21. European Commission. Communication from the Commission
on Effective, Accessible and Resilient Health Systems. Brussels:
European Commission, 2014.
22. European Commission. Investing in Health. Disease Control
Priorities in Developing Countries. Brussels: European
Commission, 2013.
68 International Journal of Epidemiology, 2018, Vol. 47, No. 1
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ije/article-abstract/47/1/58/4161435
by London School of Economics user
on 02 May 2018
